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Labor and Employment
by W. Jonathan Martin II*
and Patricia-Anne Brownback**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on case law concerning federal laws pertaining to
labor and employment. The following is a discussion of those opinions. 1
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of the United States issued two decisions
affecting labor and employment laws in 2019.
In Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis,2 the Court held that Title VII's 3
charge-filing requirement was not a jurisdictional requirement.4 When
a requirement is jurisdictional, it means that Congress specifically
targeted it to take away the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction if that
particular requirement is not met. 5 Under Title VII, an employee is
required to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
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1. For analysis of labor and employment law during the prior survey period, see W.
Jonathan Martin II, et. al., Labor and Employment Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey Law, 70
MERCER L. REV. 1093 (2019).
2. 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, H.R. 7152, 88th Cong. § 7 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2019).
4. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1850.
5. Id. at 1849.
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Id. at 1846 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1) (2019)).
Id. at 1850; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(b) (2019).
Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1847.
Id.
Id. at 1847–48.
Id. at 1848.
Id.
Id.
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Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the date the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred.6 Here, the Court held that federal courts
do not lose jurisdiction over a Title VII civil suit if the employee fails to
meet Title VII's charge-filing requirement.7
In Davis, a former county employee filed a complaint with the
County Human Resources Department, alleging that her director had
sexually harassed and assaulted her.8 Davis filed an EEOC charge in
March 2011 claiming the same. Davis's supervisor informed her that
she was still expected to report for work while her EEOC charge was
pending, but Davis told her supervisor that she planned to attend
church on a day she was scheduled to work. Her supervisor cautioned
her that if she did not report to work, she would be terminated. Davis
went to church instead of reporting to work, as requested by her
supervisor, and she was subsequently terminated by the county. 9
Davis then filed civil suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas in January 2012, alleging both religious
discrimination and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. 10 The
district court granted Fort Bend's motion for summary judgment on all
claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed as
to Davis's retaliation claim but reversed as to her religion-based
discrimination claim.11
On remand, Fort Bend claimed, for the first time, that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over Davis's religion claim because she
had not asserted that claim before the EEOC. 12 The district court found
that Davis had not met the charge-filing requirement under Title VII,
and that because the requirement was jurisdictional, the district court
no longer had adjudicatory authority to hear her civil case. The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Title VII's charge-filing requirement was
not jurisdictional. Instead, the requirement is a procedural prerequisite
to a civil suit, and since Fort Bend did not raise this procedural issue
until the case was back on remand, it lost the opportunity to use it as a
defense.13
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Id. at 1850.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2019).
Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 1850.
Id. at 1851.
Id.
139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2019).
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415.
Id. at 1412–13.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding
that the charge-filing requirement in Title VII is not jurisdictional. 14
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated that
federal courts are granted "jurisdiction over Title VII actions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331's[15] grant of general federal-question jurisdiction,
and Title VII's own jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(f)(3) . . . . Separate provisions of Title VII, § 2000e–5(e)(1) and (f)(1),
contain the Act's charge-filing requirement."16 Instead, the charge-filing
requirement requires an employee "to submit information to the EEOC
and to wait a specified period before commencing a civil action." 17 In
other words, the procedural requirements under Title VII are
mandatory but not statutorily tied to the jurisdictional prescription
found in Title VII.18
On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court held 5–4, in Lamps Plus, Inc.
v. Varela,19 that under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 20 an
ambiguous agreement cannot provide the necessary contractual basis
for compelling class arbitration.21
Here, Varela filed state and federal claims on behalf of a putative
class of approximately 1,300 fellow employees of Lamps Plus whose tax
information had been compromised as a result of a security breach at
Lamps Plus. Lamps Plus then moved to compel arbitration on an
individual rather than a class-wide basis, and to dismiss the suit—
citing the arbitration agreement its employees signed before beginning
work with the Company. While the district court granted the motion to
compel arbitration and dismissed Varela's claims, it rejected the
request to compel individual arbitration and allowed the arbitration to
move forward on a class-wide basis. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement
was ambiguous regarding class arbitration. The Ninth Circuit followed
California law in construing the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps
Plus, and adopted Varela's interpretation of the agreement which
authorized class arbitration.22
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The Supreme Court reversed.23 Writing for the 5–4 majority, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that "an ambiguous agreement [cannot] provide
the necessary 'contractual basis' for compelling class arbitration [under
the FAA]."24 The Court held that because of the marked distinctions
between individual and class arbitration, it is not appropriate for courts
to infer consent to participate in individual or class arbitration "absent
an affirmative 'contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to
do so.'"25 Because of this, "courts may not rely on state contract
principles [of ambiguity] to 'reshape traditional individualized
arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the
parties' consent."26 In relying on this basic contract principle of consent,
the Court has put employers and employees on notice that any
arbitration agreements entered into need to explicitly state whether
they will be conducted on an individual or class-wide basis.27
III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

05/29/2020 07:30:56

23. Id. at 1419.
24. Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
684 (2010)).
25. Id. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 697) (misquoted in original).
26. Id. at 1418 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)).
27. See id. at 1419.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12103, 12111–12113 (2019).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2019).
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2019).
32. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004).
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The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 28 prohibits discrimination
by employers against qualified disabled individuals.29 A "disability"
under the ADA includes "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . a record of such
impairment; or [] being regarded as having such an impairment . . . ."30
Major life activities include, among others, "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working."31
Cases brought under the ADA are examined under a burden-shifting
analysis, where the employee must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.32 To establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination,
an employee must show "(1) a disability, (2) that she was otherwise
qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was discriminated against
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based upon the disability."33 Once an employee has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the employer to
demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 34 If
the employer meets this burden, the presumption of
discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove
discrimination by offering evidence demonstrating that the
employer's explanation is pretextual.35

05/29/2020 07:30:56

33. Id.
34. Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005).
35. Americans with Disabilities Act Practice and Compliance Manual § 7:409 (2019);
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
36. 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019).
37. Id. at 1316; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1), 12102(3)(A) (2019).
38. STME, 938 F.3d at 1311.
39. Id. at 1312 (brackets in original).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. STME, LLC,36 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the
ADA only protects individuals from "discrimination because of a
current, past, or perceived disability—not a potential future
disability."37 Here the employee, Lowe, began working for Massage
Envy-South Tampa (Massage Envy) as a massage therapist in January
2012. In September 2014, Lowe requested time off so that she could
visit family in Ghana. Her request was initially approved by her
manager but was later denied by one of the owners of Massage Envy
out of fear that Lowe might contract Ebola by visiting West Africa.
Lowe was also threatened termination if she proceeded with her trip.
Lowe traveled to Ghana regardless, and was not allowed to work at
Massage Envy upon her return.38
In November 2014, Lowe filed an EEOC charge alleging that
Massage Envy discriminated against her because it "'perceived [her] as
disabled or . . . as having [the] potential to become disabled,' in violation
of the ADA."39 The EEOC filed suit on Lowe's behalf, alleging that
Ebola constitutes a disability under the ADA, and that Massage Envy
discriminated against Lowe by terminating her upon her return from
Ghana because it regarded her as disabled. 40 Also, that Massage Envy
violated the ADA by terminating Lowe based on its fear of Ebola and
"her association with people in Ghana whom Massage Envy believed to
be disabled by Ebola."41 The EEOC later moved to amend its complaint
to include an ADA unlawful interference claim. In the new claim, the
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(1) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (2) that
she was qualified for the job at that time; (3) that her employer knew
at that time that she had a relative [or associate] with a disability;
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id. at 1315; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
STME, 938 F.3d at 1316 (quoting § 12102(3)(A)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1319.
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EEOC alleged that Massage Envy violated Lowe's "right to a reasonable
accommodation if Lowe actually developed Ebola; and [] the right to
associate with disabled persons, i.e., people in Ghana with Ebola." 42
Massage Envy moved to dismiss the EEOC's amended complaint.43
The district court granted Massage Envy's motion to dismiss and
denied the EEOC's motion to file a second amended complaint. The
court found that the ADA's "regarded as having" language does not
apply to instances where the employee is currently healthy, with only
the potential to become disabled due to voluntary conduct. The district
court also rejected the EEOC's association claim because the EEOC did
not allege that Massage Envy had knowledge that anyone associated
with Lowe was exposed to or disabled by Ebola at the time she was
terminated.44
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "relevant time period
for assessing the existence of a disability, so as to trigger the ADA's
protections, is the time of the alleged discriminatory act."45 Lowe was
not disabled, or regarded as disabled by Massage Envy at the time she
filed an EEOC charge—or at any time during her employment.46 The
Eleventh Circuit declined to extend the "regarded as having" prong of
the disability definition in the ADA to include a "case where an
employer perceives a person to be presently healthy with only a
potential to become ill and disabled in the future due to the voluntary
conduct of overseas travel."47 The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
under Section 12102(3)(A), "an individual meets the requirement of
being regarded as disabled only if she was subject to termination
'because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment.'" 48
The possibility of contracting an illness or disease such as Ebola clearly
does not fit under the ADA's definition of disability given this reading.
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the EEOC's association
discrimination claim.49 In order to make out a prima facie case for
association discrimination, an employee must show:

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 82 Side A
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and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under
circumstances which raised a reasonable inference that the disability
of the relative [or associate] was a determining factor in the
employer's decision.50

Id. (quoting Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Id.
Id.
769 F. App'x 911 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 915.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 913–14.
Id. at 914.
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The court held that Lowe failed the third prong of the association
discrimination analysis.51 It was not enough that Massage Envy knew
Lowe would associate with her sister in Ghana because her sister was
never alleged to have had Ebola, nor was it sufficient that she was
traveling to a region of Africa where Ebola was prevalent. 52
In Hudson v. Tyson Farms, Inc.,53 the court ruled against an
employee in holding that an employee's back injury and asthma did not
qualify as a disability under the ADA. 54 Hudson began working as a
tray packer at Tyson Farms, Inc. (Tyson) in August 2015. After being
hired, Hudson listed asthma and back problems on the health
assessment provided by Tyson, but did not indicate that she had any
work restrictions. Shortly after beginning work, Hudson complained of
back pain while working on the factory line, and that the ammonia in
the plant aggravated her asthma.55
Hudson saw her personal doctor after only a month of working at
Tyson. He imposed restrictions limiting her to forty-five minutes of
standing every hour. Tyson informed Hudson they would not be able to
accommodate these restrictions, so Hudson visited a second doctor to
try to get her work restrictions removed. The second doctor determined
that Hudson's back was completely healthy with a full range of motion
and released her back to work with no restrictions; however, he did
suggest that she use floor mats while at work in order to alleviate her
back pain. Upon returning to work, Tyson was not able to provide
Hudson with a specified floor mat, nor did her manager allow her to
leave her line early to use her inhaler. Hudson quit Tyson after only
being employed for a month.56
Hudson filed suit against Tyson in September 2016, alleging that
Tyson forced her to resign after they failed to accommodate her back
injury and asthma. The district court granted Tyson's motion for
summary judgment, and Hudson appealed.57 On appeal, the Eleventh
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Id. at 915.
Id. at 915–16.
Id. at 915–17.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 917–18.
Id. at 918–19.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919.
758 F. App'x 825 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 828.
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Circuit determined that Hudson failed to provide Tyson with any proof
that she had a medical condition that substantially limited her ability
to work.58 In making this determination, the court focused on the
diagnoses of Hudson's doctors regarding her back. 59 The first doctor put
work restrictions in place, but made no medical diagnosis of her back,
and the second doctor removed the work restrictions and determined
her back was normal with a full range of motion. Hudson also failed to
show that her asthma affected any of her major life activities. 60
Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that Tyson did not fail to
reasonably accommodate Hudson.61 Hudson identified her back issues
but did not indicate a need for restrictions. Tyson was not aware that
Hudson required a reasonable accommodation, despite this, Tyson still
allowed Hudson to use floor mats (that she provided) throughout the
facility.62 Therefore, the court reasoned, Tyson's refusal to provide
Hudson with a specific floor mat was reasonable because Hudson did
not have a known disability or any work restrictions that required the
use of a floor mat while at work. 63 Neither did Hudson make a specific
accommodation request for her asthma. The only request she made was
to her manager asking if she could take a break to use her inhaler.
Even if her asthma was considered a disability under the ADA, she
never identified an accommodation or failure to accommodate her
asthma.64 Therefore, the court held, Tyson never failed to accommodate
Hudson's asthma.65 Lastly, the court held that Tyson did not
constructively discharge Hudson because "Hudson deprived Tyson of
the opportunity to engage in the interactive accommodations process
[by leaving Tyson]."66
In Connelly v. WellStar Health System, Inc.,67 the court held that an
employer's reason for terminating an employee—because she reported
to work impaired and under the influence of prescription medication—
was not pretextual under the ADA. 68 Connelly brought a failure to
accommodate under the ADA, discriminatory termination under the
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29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2019).
Connelly, 758 F. App'x at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 830 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 831.

05/29/2020 07:30:56

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

42275-mcr_71-4 Sheet No. 83 Side A

ADA, and retaliation claims under both the ADA and the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),69 respectively. The district court held that
WellStar Health System, Inc. (WellStar) did not fail to accommodate
Connelly because she did not request an accommodation. 70 As to the
discriminatory termination and retaliation claims, the Eleventh Circuit
jumped straight to the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason analysis
after assuming (without analysis) that Connelly presented a prima facie
case on the claims.71 The court determined that Connelly failed to show
that WellStar's proffered legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for
terminating her was pretextual.72
WellStar had a company policy that stated an employee may be
subject to termination if they "report to work or perform work while
impaired due to the influence of a prescribed medication . . . ."73 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the reason for firing Connelly was not
pretextual.74 Connelly did not dispute that she was impaired, or that
she previously reported this medication, but she did allege that
"because WellStar did not consult a physician to determine whether the
unreported drugs caused the impairment its proffered reason is
pretextual."75 The court disagreed with this reasoning.76 It held that
even if WellStar was mistaken as to whether Connelly's impairment
was a result of the unreported medication, their "honest belief" that she
was both "impaired" and taking an unreported prescribed medication—
which was a violation of their policy—and grounds for termination. 77
Also, according to the court, WellStar did not fail to accommodate her
disability.78 Even though there were instances in the past where
WellStar allowed Connelly to compose herself after an emotional
episode, this did not rise to the level of providing her a
disability-specific accommodation under the ADA, largely in part
because she never requested such accommodation for her emotional
episodes. For this same reason—Connelly did not request an
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accommodation—her retaliation claims under both the ADA and FMLA
failed.79
IV. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) 80 does not allow employers
to discriminate based upon the protected classes of: "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."81 This includes limiting, segregating,
or classifying employees "in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 82 For an employee to prove
disparate impact under Title VII, they must demonstrate that the
employer used a particular employment practice on the basis of one of
the above protected classes, and the employer cannot show that the
alleged practice is job related and related with business necessity. 83 In
the Eleventh Circuit, for an employee to succeed on a claim for hostile
work environment under Title VII, they must prove five elements:
(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on her race,
(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive
working environment, and (5) the employer is responsible for the
environment under a theory of vicarious or direct liability.84

05/29/2020 07:30:56

79. Id. at 831–32.
80. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2019).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2019).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2019).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2019).
84. Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018).
85. 775 F. App'x 603 (11th Cir. 2019).
86. Id. at 606–07 (quoting Trask v. Sec'y, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179,
1195 (11th Cir. 2016)).
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In Nurse v. City of Alpharetta,85 the Eleventh Circuit held that an
African-American former police officer's Title VII claims for racial
discrimination and hostile work environment were not sufficient
because he failed to allege that he was subjected to intentional
discrimination or that the harassment that occurred was severe and
pervasive enough to "alter the conditions of . . . employment and create
an abusive working environment."86 While working as a police officer
for the City of Alpharetta (the City), Nurse was accused of sexual
assault after giving an intoxicated woman a courtesy ride to her hotel.
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Id. at 604–06.
Id. at 608.
Id. at 606.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id. (brackets in original).
Id.
776 F. App'x 625 (11th Cir. 2019).
See id. at 626.
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Nurse was terminated following an internal investigation, and he
subsequently filed a racial discrimination charge with the EEOC. In
May 2017, Nurse filed suit against the City and five individually named
employees of the City, alleging race discrimination and hostile work
environment under Title VII. Nurse alleged that he was subject to more
severe punishment than his white counterparts in the police
department and that the City created a hostile work environment for
African-American males through a pattern of harsh discipline. The
district court dismissed all the claims for failure to state a claim. 87
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this dismissal. 88 Agreeing with the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit stated that all of Nurse's pleadings
were "framed in a wholly speculative and conclusory way."89 Because
Nurse alleged no facts offering a comparator or any specific facts that
rise above speculation, the court held that there was no way to
determine which employees were treated differently on the basis of
race.90 The court held that Nurse's hostile work environment claim
failed for the same reasons.91 Even the most specific allegation, the
defendants "have created and maintained [a] hostile work environment
through a pattern of more severe disciplinary action to African
Americans [than] their white counterparts,"92 did not allow the court to
identify who created the hostile work environment, how it was
maintained, or who was affected by the hostile work environment.93
In Rodriguez v. Miami Dade Public Housing and Community
Development,94 the Eleventh Circuit held that reports of general
harassment are not enough to support a Title VII claim alone; an
employee must specify that the harassment is based on their belonging
to a protected class. 95 Rodriguez, a female Cuban employee of Miami
Dade County (the County), reported that her supervisor harassed her
on several occasions at work about her management style and job
performance. While Rodriguez presented facts that showed her
supervisor made discriminatory comments concerning her Cuban
nationality, she was unable to produce any evidence that those
discriminatory comments were reported to anyone before she was
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Id.
Id. at 626–27.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id.
778 F. App'x 690 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693 (brackets and emphasis in original).
Id.
882 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2018).
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terminated. Rodriguez sued the County for national origin
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the County.96
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.97 The court noted that Rodriguez
failed to make out a prima facie case for retaliation, which required a
showing that: "(1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she
suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there [was] a casual
connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse
action."98 Rodriguez's general complaints about her supervisor's "poor
treatment of her [were] insufficient to establish that she engaged in
protected activity."99 The court further explained that, "she must have
explicitly or implicitly communicated her belief that the employer's
practice constituted unlawful employment discrimination." 100 Rodriguez
never did so.
In Heatherly v. University of Alabama Board of Trustees,101 the court
examined the causation standards for single-motive and mixed-motive
discrimination claims under Title VII.102 Heatherly was employed by
the University of Alabama (the University), and she brought suit
against the University for sex discrimination under both Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act, claiming that her sex was at least a motivating
factor in the University paying her less than her male comparators. The
district court granted summary judgment to the University. 103
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.104 The court held that in order for a
mixed-motive discrimination claim to defeat summary judgment the
employee must offer evidence that: "(1) the defendant took an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) [a protected
characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant's adverse
employment action."105 The court held that Heatherly met the first
prong but failed the second. 106 Heatherly attempted to analogize her
case to that of the employee in Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc.107
In Bowen, there was evidence that the employee's managers made
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decisions based off of sexual bias and, that they repeatedly were
unwilling to treat women as equals in the workplace. 108 The court
reasoned that Heatherly failed to offer similar evidence that would
make her case comparable to Bowen.109
The court also rejected expert testimony offered by Heatherly—
mainly because the expert relied on faulty assumptions—that suggested
there was a systematic pay disparity between men and women at the
University, mainly because the expert relied on faulty assumptions. 110
The expert assumed "that an equal pay grade implied comparability," 111
despite evidence to the contrary being presented. The expert compared
Heatherly's pay to different jobs with different responsibilities, and this
was not a proper comparison for the purposes of Title VII or the Equal
Pay Act.112 Because Heatherly could not point to similarly situated male
comparators within the University as having higher pay than her, the
court held there was insufficient evidence to conclude that sex was a
motivating factor for her disparate pay.113
V. FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

Id. at 1363.
Heatherly, 778 F. App'x at 693.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693–94.
Id. at 694.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2019).
29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1) (2019).
Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D)).
See id.
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The Family Leave and Medical Act (FMLA) 114 prohibits employers
from interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of or the
attempt to exercise, any of the rights under the FMLA. 115 The Eleventh
Circuit recognizes two claims from aggrieved employees: retaliation and
interference claims.116 Under the FMLA, an employee is entitled to take
twelve weeks of leave over a twelve month period for their own serious
health condition or the serious health conditions of family members,
and be reinstated upon their return from leave.117 For interference
claims, employees must prove that they were denied their benefits
under the FMLA.118 However, the denial of a benefit is not the only way
employers can interfere with the right of an employee; an employer may
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119. Id.
120. Id. at 1270 (quoting Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of
Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001)).
121. Id.
122. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
123. Jones, 854 F.3d at 1271.
124. Id. at 1271.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. 770 F. App'x 523 (11th Cir. 2019).
128. Id. at 527; see 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c) (2019).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1) (2019).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2) (2019).
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also be responsible for interference where it discourages its employees
from using the leave to which they are entitled. 119
As for retaliation, an employee must prove that the employer
"intentionally discriminated against him in the form of an adverse
employment action for having exercised an FMLA right." 120 This can be
shown either through direct or circumstantial evidence.121 The courts
will apply the three-part burden-shifting analysis outlined in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,122 where there is only
circumstantial evidence.123 First, the plaintiff must show the three
elements of a prima facie case: "(1) [he] engaged in [a] statutorily
protected activity[;] (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and
(3) the decision was causally related to the protected activity." 124 If the
plaintiff can do this, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.125 If
the employer can do that, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show pretext, or that the proffered reason is not true. 126
In Smith v. St. Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc.,127 the
Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant willfully violated her rights under the FMLA, and therefore
was not entitled to the three year statute of limitations provided by the
FMLA.128 Normally, under the FMLA an action may only be brought
within two years "after the date of the last event constituting the
alleged violation for which the action is brought." 129 However, if an
action is "brought for a willful violation of section 105 [29 U.S.C. § 2615]
, such action may be brought within 3 years of the date of the last event
constituting the alleged violation for which such action is brought." 130
In the present case, Smith failed to file a claim within the general
two-year statute of limitations under FMLA. However, she argued that
St. Joseph's/Candler Health System, Inc.'s (St. Joseph's) FMLA
violations were willful and her claims should fall within the three-year
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131. Smith, 770 F. App'x at 524–26.
132. Id. at 525.
133. Id. at 527.
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2019).
135. Smith, 770 F. App'x at 526 (quoting McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 484 U.S.
128, 133 (1988)).
136. See Bass v. Potter, 522 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2008); Hoffman v. Prof'l
Med Team, 394 F.3d 414, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2005); Porter v. New York Univ. Sch. of Law,
392 F.3d 530, 531–32 (2d Cir. 2004); Hanger v. Lake County, 390 F.3d 579, 583–84 (8th
Cir. 2004); Hillstrom v. Best Western TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2003).
137. Smith, 770 F. App'x at 527.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 774 F. App'x 529 (11th Cir. 2019).
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statute of limitations provided by § 2617(c)(2). Smith alleged that St.
Joseph's intentionally miscalculated and misled her about her FMLA
hours and intentionally disrupted her access to FMLA benefits, and to
show this, she introduced a number of employment documents and
policies that she believed showed the hospital had miscalculated her
available FMLA leave. She alleged that this evidence showed willful
conduct.131 The district court found that Smith's proffered evidence was
not enough to enable her claims to fall under the three-year statute of
limitations and granted summary judgment for St. Joseph's.132
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Smith's evidence did not
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether St. Joseph's
conduct was willful or not. 133 The court noted that while the FMLA does
not define "willful," the Supreme Court has defined "willful" in the
context of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 134 as conduct that was
"'voluntary,' 'deliberate,' and 'intentional' . . . [and] not merely
negligent."135 While other circuits had adopted this interpretation of
"willful" for FMLA purposes,136 the court declined to resolve the issue of
"willfulness" because Smith had not raised any argument concerning
it.137 Regardless, the court followed the district court's assumption that
the FLSA's definition of "willful" "provide[d] the right standard for
assessing Smith's FMLA claim."138 With this standard in mind, the
court held that Smith produced no evidence that "St. Joseph's knew or
showed reckless disregard as to whether its conduct violated the
FMLA,"139 and as a result, her claim was not eligible for the three-year
statute of limitations provided by the FMLA. 140
In Shannon v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,141 the court
held that an employer did not interfere with an employee's FMLA
rights, nor did it retaliate against her for taking FMLA, when the
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Id. at 545.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 532–34.
Id. at 537–38.
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employee was terminated shortly after requesting FMLA leave. 142
Shannon worked for National Railroad Passenger Company, d/b/a
Amtrak (Amtrak), for twenty-eight years, and she held multiple
positions with Amtrak during that time. Although Shannon received
multiple promotions and employee awards at Amtrak, she was the
subject of nineteen internal ethics complaints. However, her direct
supervisor often gave her positive reviews, and even gave her the
highest overall performance rating for 2014. 143
Beginning in June 2015, Shannon began to take intermittent FMLA
leave for a leg injury, and from late-2015 to mid-2016 she was
permitted to work on a reduced schedule that included telework three
days a week. In 2017, Amtrak underwent another restructuring that
saw new managerial positions become available. Shannon applied for
one of the newly created managerial positions, but was not selected due
to poor interview performance, bad marks from her supervisor, and her
alleged union relationships. Her supervisor noted that while she
historically was one the better performing managers at Amtrak, she
had "been confrontational" and had "not been readily available to
assist," in the several years leading up to the 2017 restructuring. 144
Subsequently, Shannon complained to Amtrak's Equal Employment
Opportunity (EEO) officials that she was not being selected for positions
on the basis of race and her medical condition. Amtrak began
investigating her complaint, but they were unable to complete its
investigation because Shannon obtained legal representation and filed
an external complaint; as a result, Amtrak ended its investigation per
its policy. On May 24, 2017, Amtrak sent Shannon a formal termination
letter stating that because her position had been eliminated as a result
of the restructuring, her employment with Amtrak would end on June
8, 2017. One day before her employment with Amtrak was to be
terminated, Shannon emailed Amtrak requesting FMLA leave based on
a doctor letter stating she suffered from "tachycardia, elevated blood
pressure, anxiety, and work-related insomnia and depression." Amtrak
denied her request on June 23, 2017, because she was no longer
employed.145
Shannon filed suit, alleging—among other things—that Amtrak
interfered with her FMLA rights when it terminated her employment,
and that it retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave. The district
court found that Shannon failed to establish an FMLA retaliation claim
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146. Id. at 538–39.
147. Id. at 544–45.
148. Id. at 544 (citing Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th
Cir. 2010)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th
Cir. 2015)).
152. Id. (citing Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018)).
153. Id. at 544–45 (quoting Batson, 897 F.3d at 1331).
154. Id. at 545 (citing Krutzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir.
2010)).
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because she failed to proffer evidence that any hiring manager, other
than her direct supervisor, knew that she had taken FMLA leave in the
past and had not demonstrated that the hiring managers' reason for not
hiring Shannon was pretextual or motivated by her FMLA activities.
The district court also found that Shannon was terminated for purely
business reasons, which did not constitute FMLA interference.146
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Shannon failed to state
claims for both retaliation and interference under the FMLA. 147 For the
retaliation claim, because there was no direct evidence of retaliatory
intent by Amtrak, Shannon's claim was examined under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis.148 Here, the court held that Shannon
failed to show that Amtrak's decision to terminate her was causally
related to her request for FMLA leave, mainly due to the fact that those
Amtrak employees in hiring positions were not aware of her FMLA
leave.149
The court also held that Amtrak did not interfere with Shannon's
rights under the FMLA when it terminated her. 150 In order to
successfully establish an FMLA interference claim, an employee must
demonstrate that: "(1) she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA;
and (2) her employer denied her that benefit." 151 Also, "[i]f the employee
shows she was entitled to a benefit, she need only demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was denied the benefit; the
employer's motives are irrelevant."152 When an interference claim stems
from termination of the employee, "an employer may affirmatively
defend against the claim by establishing that it would have terminated
the employee regardless of her request for or use of FMLA leave." 153 The
court continued, "an employer is not liable for failing to reinstate an
employee after she has taken FMLA leave if it can show that it refused
to reinstate her for a reason unrelated to FMLA leave." 154 For an
employer to be held liable for FMLA interference, "the request for leave
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must have been the proximate cause of the termination." 155 Shannon
argued that she was still employed by Amtrak on June 7, 2017, when
she requested FMLA leave, even though her position with Amtrak had
been eliminated in early 2017 because of restructuring.156 Therefore,
the court held, Shannon's request for FMLA leave came long after the
elimination of her position with Amtrak, meaning her termination was
due to business concerns and not her FMLA request.157
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Id. (citing Schaaf, 602 F.3d at 1242).
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2019).
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2019).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2019).
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1).
29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).
758 F. App'x 844 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 849–50.
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The Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA)158 requires employers to
pay covered employees engaged in commerce a minimum of $7.25 for all
hours worked.159 Additionally, if an employee works over forty hours in
any workweek, an employer is required to pay that employee overtime
at a rate of one and one-half times the employee's regular rate. 160
Employees can be "covered" by the FLSA in one of two ways: enterprise
coverage or individual coverage.161 For enterprise coverage, an
employee must work for an employer that has at least two employees
and has an annual dollar of sales or business done of at least
$500,000.162 An employee may be covered individually if their work
regularly involves them in commerce between the states and they are
"engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." 163
In P&K Restaurant Enterprise, LLC v. Jackson,164 an employee
brought a putative collection action against her employer, the owner of
P&K Restaurant Enterprise, LLC (the nightclub), claiming that she
was not paid minimum wage under the FLSA. 165 The Eleventh Circuit
held that a jury award of liquidated damages was appropriate when the
nightclub was unable to demonstrate that its FLSA violations were in
good faith or based on grounds that would make it unfair to impose
such damages.166
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Id. at 846.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 846–47.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 847.
29 U.S.C. §§ 203(m), 206(a)(1)(C) (2019).
29. U.S.C. § 203(m)(2) (2019).
Kubiak v. S.W. Cowboy, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1355 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
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While employed by the nightclub as a server, Jackson would typically
work three to four days a week, and her shifts would last seven and a
half hours.167 The nightclub did not record employee tips, issue pay
stubs, provide tax documents for employees, or operate a time clock.
Jackson alleged that she was told by her supervisor she would make
$25 a night and would get to keep all of her tips. However, she claimed
she was never told about tip credit reductions to the minimum wage,
was never told tips were going to be counted as wages, and that the
nightclub failed to post any FLSA notices regarding minimum wage and
tip credit reduction.168
In her complaint, Jackson alleged the nightclub failed to pay her
minimum wage under the FLSA and failed to pay similarly situated
employees the minimum wage under the FLSA. The case went to a jury
trial, after which the district court accepted the jury's award of $6,308
in damages in addition to the court adding on $6,308 in liquidated
damages and awarded attorney's fees and costs of $118,894.20. 169 On
appeal, the nightclub argued the "jury verdict was unsupported by the
evidence, that liquidated damages were improper, and that the amount
of attorneys' fees was disproportionate to the result in this case." 170 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, allowing Jackson to keep all forms of
damages awarded by the district court.171
The court held the nightclub's argument—that the evidence
presented by Jackson did not allow for a jury to find that they failed to
pay her as a tipped employee under the FLSA—did not have any
standing.172 Under the FLSA, an employer may credit an employee's
tips toward the minimum wage requirement of $7.25 an hour. 173
However, if the employer chooses to apply a tip credit to the minimum
wage requirement, they must inform the employee of the relevant tip
credit provisions under the FLSA. 174 If an employer fails to notify an
employee of the relevant FLSA provisions, they are not able to take
advantage of the tip credit, even if the employee in question suffered no
economic harm as a result.175 In the present case, the nightclub failed to
inform Jackson of the relevant FLSA provisions regarding tip credits,
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Jackson, 758 F. App'x at 849.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2019)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 260 (2019)).
Id. (citing Joiner v. City of Macon, 814 F.2d 1537, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 849–50.
Id.
775 F. App'x 622 (11th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 624–25.
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therefore, according to the court, there was enough evidence for a jury
to "conclude[] that [the nightclub] was statutorily ineligible to claim any
tip credit."176
As for the liquidated damages, the court also rejected the nightclub's
argument that its FLSA violations "'[could not] be willful' because
Jackson 'was paid more than the minimum wage.'" 177 Per the FLSA,
when an employer violates the minimum wage provision, that employer
is liable for the affected employee's "unpaid minimum wages, or their
unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional
equal amount as liquidated damages." 178 However, any employer may
be able to escape paying liquidated damages if it can demonstrate that
its FLSA minimum wage violations "'[were] in good faith and that he
had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a
violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act,' then 'the court may, in its
sound discretion, award no liquidated damages.'"179 The burden of proof
lies with the employer to demonstrate that its FLSA violation was in
good faith and that awarding liquidated damages to an affected
employee would be unfair to the employer. 180
In the present case, the court held that the nightclub operated in
such a way that it was blind to its responsibilities under the FLSA
because "[the nightclub] kept no payroll records, produced no evidence
that it sought or relied upon legal guidance, and did not even track how
much money its employees were making in tips."181 The court held it
inconsequential that Jackson did in fact bring home more than the
minimum wage, it still failed its duty as a business owner to operate in
compliance with the FLSA.182
In Nieman v. National Claims Adjusters, Inc.,183 the court used the
economic reality inquiry to determine that a property and casualty
insurance claims professional was an independent contractor, rather
than an employee for purposes of the FLSA. 184 Nieman filed claims
against National Claims Adjusters, Inc. (National), alleging National
had failed to pay him, and that he was victim of retaliatory discharge in
violation of the FLSA. The district court granted National's motion to
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dismiss for failure to state a claim, pointing to the fact that Nieman was
an independent contractor, not an employee, and therefore was not
protected by the FLSA.185
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.186 The court held the district court
was correct in using the economic reality test to determine if Nieman
was an employee of National for purposes of the FLSA.187 The economic
reality test is guided by the following factors:
(1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control as to the
manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged
employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his
managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment
or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers; (4)
whether the service rendered requires a special skill; (5) the degree of
permanency and duration of the working relationship; [and] (6) the
extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged
employer's business.188

Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2019).
Nieman, 775 F. App'x at 625.
Id. at 624.
Id. (quoting Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (11th Cir.
Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While these six factors help the court determine independent
contractor status, the ultimate question is "whether the individual is 'in
business for himself' or is 'dependent upon finding employment in the
business of others.'"189 In applying the above test to Nieman, the court
held "the first, third, fourth, and fifth factors favored independent
contractor status while the second and sixth factors do not weigh in
favor of either."190
The first factor favored independent contractor status because
National exercised little control over Nieman, "[he] controlled when he
started work for National and for how long, how many assignments he
took from National . . . when he received those assignments . . . [and]
the geographic location within which he took assignments." 191 Such a
level of autonomy, the court held, demonstrated Nieman was in
business for himself.192
The third factor also weighed in favor of independent contractor
status.193 Nieman provided for the majority of his equipment and
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materials needed for his work, this included "his own home office, a
laptop, and iPad for field work and was equipped with a vehicle, ladder,
measuring tools, digital voice and photographic equipment . . . ."194
The fourth factor favored independent contractor status because
Nieman's job as an insurance claims professional required him to obtain
a license; meaning his position required a special skill.195
Finally the fifth factor weighed in favor of independent contractor
status because his work for National was not permanent. 196 Nieman
himself acknowledged that he was hired by National as a result of the
influx of claims arising out of Hurricane Irma, meaning his job was not
intended to be permanent and was limited in duration.197
The court held that because "four of the six factors weigh strongly in
favor of independent contractor status," Nieman was an independent
contractor for purposes of the FLSA and was therefore not entitled to its
protections.198
VII. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2019).
See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2019).
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 153 (2019).
Id.
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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 199 was enacted in 1935 to
give employees the right to form and join unions, while also requiring
employers to engage in the collective bargaining process with the
bargaining representative chosen by its employees.200 The NLRA
achieves this by protecting employees' "full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection."201 The NLRA is
enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (the Board). 202 The
Board is comprised of five members nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate, with its primary responsibilities being to
protect employee rights under the NLRA, to prevent unfair labor
practices, and to interpret the NLRA. 203 The NLRA and the Board
protect not only unionized work forces but also non-unionized
employees' rights to self-organize and to bargain collectively through
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representatives of their choosing, "and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . ."204
In Security Walls, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,205 the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB)
decision that a government security contractor violated the NLRA when
it terminated three employees for misconduct under its contract with
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) instead of its own disciplinary
policy.206
The IRS entered into a security contract with Security Walls, Inc.
(Security Walls) to provide protective services for one of its facilities in
Austin, Texas. As part of its contract with the IRS, Security Walls
agreed to a "Performance Work Statement" (PWS) with the IRS that
outlined expected employee conduct and listed conduct that was cause
for immediate termination or removal from the Austin facility. At the
same time, Security Walls employed guards who were members of a
union and maintained its own "Disciplinary Action/Policy Statement"
(the Policy Statement) that, according to Security Walls, "superseded all
other policies concerning this subject."207
In April 2015, Security Walls placed three of its guards on indefinite
suspension, citing the guards' violations of the PWS as its reasoning.
The union, representing the guards, then filed a grievance over the
suspensions, alleging Security Walls failed to follow the Policy
Statement it had in place with the guards. Following an internal
investigation, Security Walls determined the three guards did in fact
violate expected conduct provisions of the PWS and subsequently
terminated the three guards' employment. As a result, the union filed a
charge alleging Security Walls had committed unfair labor practices
under the NLRA, which led to the NLRB General Counsel to issue a
complaint against Security Walls. 208 Both the administrative law judge
(ALJ) who heard the charge and the NLRB found that Security Walls
committed unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA "when (1) in
violation of the Policy Statement's graduated disciplinary protocol, it
suspended indefinitely and then discharged the guards and (2) it
refused to bargain with the Union following those discharges." 209 Under
the NLRA, it is considered an unfair labor practice for an employer to
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"refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees."210 Such refusal includes changing the terms and conditions
of a mandatory subject—such as a disciplinary policy or negotiations
over termination of employment—without giving the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative the chance to bargain for the
change.211 In the eyes of the ALJ and NLRB, Security Walls's
imposition of the PWS on the guards without first allowing the guards'
union to bargain for a change in disciplinary policy and then refusing to
meet with the union following their termination, was a violation of the
NLRA.212 Security Walls then petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for
review.213
The Eleventh Circuit denied Security Walls's petition to review. 214
The court held that the main issue was whether the PWS compelled
Security Walls to terminate the guards despite the existence of the
Policy Statement, which would have required more progressive
punishment for the guards in question. 215 The court rejected the
argument that Security Walls had "no choice" but to punish the guards
under the disciplinary provisions contained in the PWS, thereby
absolving them of any liability under the NLRA. 216 Instead holding that
the PWS was merely a reflection of the agreement between Security
Walls and the IRS, "but not necessarily between [Security Walls] and
its own employees."217 The court did note that Security Walls might
have voluntarily "subjected itself to two masters—its contractual
obligations to the IRS on the one hand and its duties under the NLRA
to its employees on the other."218
Regardless, the court held that upon further examination of the
PWS, it was entirely possible for Security Walls to comply with both the
PWS and the Policy Statement without terminating the guards.219
While the guards might have engaged in conduct that was in violation
of the PWS, it was not so egregious to constitute termination under the
PWS, nor did the IRS demand the guards be terminated. 220 Therefore,
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Security Walls was able to perform its contract with the IRS without
violating the NLRA by refusing to bargain with the guards' union, and
engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA by failing to
do so.221
In Advanced Masonry Associates, LLC v. National Labor Relations
Board,222 the Eleventh Circuit declined an employer's petition to review
after the NLRB found the employer violated § 8(a)(1)223 of the NLRA
during a union campaign when it threatened employee wages would be
reduced if the union won the election.224 Bricklayers and Allied
Craftworkers, Local 8 Southeast (the Union) filed a petition to become
the exclusive bargaining representative of Advanced Masonry
Associates, LLC (Advanced Masonry), 225 after which Advanced Masonry
began aggressively campaigning against union representation.226
Following the election, the Union filed charges with the NLRB,
alleging that Advanced Masonry conducted unfair labor practices
leading up to the election. Following a hearing, an ALJ found two
instances where Advanced Masonry threatened it would reduce wages if
the Union won the election.227
In the first, Richard Karp, an owner of Advanced Masonry, told a
group of employees through his translator, Aleksei Feliz, that "they
were going to receive a ballot and that the company wanted them to
vote in the election."228 In a response to an employee question about
wages, Karp responded, "their wages are decided by the market." 229 The
same day, Feliz told a group of employees "to vote against the Union
because it was 'taking [their] money.' He said voting for the Union
would cause their rates to drop from $22 per hour to
$18-and-some-change per hour."230 Although Feliz denied making this
statement, the ALJ credited it to him in light of an employee's
testimony to the contrary.231 The second came when an Advanced
Masonry foreman mentioned the Union election to a group of employees
at another jobsite, stating the Union "probably wo[uld]n't be good for
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wages."232 The ALJ found these two instances "'str[uck] to the heart of
[the] mason's livelihood' and . . . 'sent a clear message to employees that
the Company would reduce wages if the employees selected the
Union.'"233 The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's decision that Advanced
Masonry had violated § 8(a)(1) by threatening a drop in employee wages
if the Union won the election. Advanced Masonry subsequently filed a
petition for review.234
When reviewing factual findings made by the NLRB, the Eleventh
Circuit uses the substantial evidence standard, meaning the factual
record must contain "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 235 Also, when
examining an ALJ's decision, the court is "'bound by an ALJ's credibility
determinations' unless they are 'inherently unreasonable or selfcontradictory' or 'based on an inadequate reason, or no reason at all.'" 236
The court held there was substantial evidence to support the NLRB's
decision that Advanced Masonry committed unfair labor practices when
it threatened employees with a drop in wages should they vote for the
Union.237 The court rejected Advanced Masonry's argument that it
should not have credited Feliz with his alleged statements regarding
wages because the NLRB relied entirely on an employee's testimony. 238
Advanced Masonry argued that Feliz merely translated Karp's
statements to employees and that nothing in the record indicated he
was anti-union, however the court held these contentions were not
enough to demonstrate that "the Board's credibility determinations
were self-contradictory, inherently unreasonable, or based on
inadequate reasons."239 The court also declined to overturn the NLRB's
finding that the Advanced Masonry's foreman's statement about wages
for the same reason cited with regards to Feliz. 240 The foreman also
denied making any statements about wages, however there was
employee testimony stating that he did in fact make the statements
attributed to him.241 Because of this, the court was unwilling to hold
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that the NLRB's decision to credit an employee's testimony over the
foreman's testimony was not supported by substantial evidence based
on the record.242
VIII. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Id.
775 F. App'x 978 (11th Cir. 2019).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2019).
Jones, 775 F. App'x at 983.
Id. at 980–81.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 991.
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In Jones v. RS & H, Inc.,243 the court held that a plaintiff was not
able to bring a collective action against his employer for violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)244 because he failed to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for a claim of discrimination against a
nationwide class.245 Jones alleged his former employer, RS & H, Inc.
(RSH) engaged in age discrimination in violation of the ADEA when he
was terminated as part of a reduction of force. RSH maintained a
nationwide presence, including a Tampa, Florida office where Jones
worked. In June 2015, Jones was among seven RSH employees in the
Tampa office chosen to be terminated. Jones was fifty-three at the time
and was one of five terminated employees over the age of forty. The
decision to terminate those seven employees in the Tampa office was
made by the Tampa division manager, aged fifty-one, which was then
approved by the regional manager, aged sixty-eight.246
Jones alleged that twenty-one out of the twenty-three employees
terminated in the reduction in force, including the Tampa office, were
over the age of forty. He also claimed that RSH routinely would not
allow non-officers to work until retirement, that they fired older
employees in favor of younger ones, and that RSH management had
made ageist comments. For these reasons, Jones claimed that the
reduction in force was merely a pretext for intentional age
discrimination and filed a putative collective-action complaint under
the ADEA.247 The district court denied Jones's motion to proceed on
behalf of a nationwide class, finding that Jones failed to sufficiently
allege that "RSH had a pattern or practice of discriminating against its
employees at all locations based on their age." 248
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 249 In order for a plaintiff
"to bring a collective action under the ADEA on behalf of a class of
employees [the plaintiff] must show that the class is 'similarly
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situated.'"250 The court explained, "[o]ne way of doing so—though not
the only way—is to provide evidence that the class was subject to a
'unified policy, plan, or scheme of discrimination.'" 251 According to the
court, Jones failed to establish that any alleged discrimination occurred
at a local level and there was no evidence indicative of a company-wide
policy or practice of ageism.252 To support this holding, the court noted
that Jones's argument that all the employees RSH terminated in June
2015 were subject to the "same general pattern and practice of
discrimination," did not hold water because any alleged ageist
comments made by management were "vague anecdotal observations—
particularly when viewed against RSH's affidavits stating that the RIF
[termination] selections at the Tampa office were made locally by
[management], who had no role in the [termination] selections at RSH's
other offices."253 Therefore, the court held the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it found that Jones "had not shown a
'reasonable basis' for [his] claim of discrimination against a nationwide
class."254
IX. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under labor and
employment law are becoming progressively more challenging each
year. Regardless of whether a practitioner specializes in state, federal,
administrative, or other matters pertaining to labor and employment, it
is important to recognize and stay abreast of the ever-evolving trends,
policies, cases, and federal guidelines. How the law will evolve, and
change, remains to be seen. For now, the cases above give practitioners
some guidance for the time being.
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